Protocol Report · Ethereum
DemoThis is a sample report generated from public on-chain data, not a live audit. Run a fresh scan on any address to see current governance state.

Yearn

Critical Risk
Why this score
  • Implementation can be replaced (upgradeable proxy)
  • Multisig controls upgrades
  • No enforced delay found on discovered upgrade paths
  • 1 governance bypass path detected
Control-Plane Score
12/100
Higher = cleaner
Control plane only · code-layer risk is out of scope

Critical Upgrade Risk Detected

Critical Risk

Upgrades can be executed in 0 seconds. Several paths can bypass the standard governance process.

What this means

The control setup leaves users and monitoring systems very little (or no) time to react if something goes wrong.

Reaction window

0 seconds. No enforced delay before an upgrade takes effect.

Proxy Pattern
Mostly fixed, with governance
Core code is fixed; some peripheral pieces can change
Who Can Upgrade
Multisig wallet
Multiple signers must approve before any upgrade
Reaction Window
0 seconds
No enforced delay before upgrade execution
Governance Bypass Paths
1 detected
Upgrade routes that may avoid expected governance controls

Key Findings

The main control-plane risks found in this scan, with plain-English impact and remediation.

Critical Risk

No effective upgrade delay

Meaning: Upgrades can be executed immediately. There is no enforced waiting period between an upgrade being proposed and it taking effect on-chain.

Fix: Enforce a meaningful timelock delay (e.g. 24–72 hours) on every upgrade path so users and monitoring systems have time to react.

Critical Risk

Governance bypass paths detected

Meaning: 1 upgrade route may avoid the expected governance process.

Fix: Audit each alternative path. Remove direct upgrade permissions and ensure every route enforces the same delay and approval requirements.

Structural Risk

Upgradeable proxy detected

Meaning: The protocol logic can be replaced after deployment. This is common, but it makes the safety of the upgrade process critical.

Fix: Document the upgrade process publicly and monitor implementation changes in real time.

Possible Failure Scenario

A concrete sequence of how this risk could play out. This is illustrative, not a prediction.

This is not a detected exploit. It illustrates the control failure this configuration may allow.

  1. 1Someone with control over a bypass path (a permissioned role, an admin contract, or a stale signer) initiates an upgrade.
  2. 2Because the path bypasses the standard governance process, no public proposal or vote is required.
  3. 3The upgrade reaches the proxy without the usual review window.
  4. 4The new implementation can change protocol behavior: fees, withdrawal rules, ownership, or core logic.
  5. 5Users and monitoring systems may not see the change until it is already live.

Recommended Fixes

5 of 7 recommended fixes still apply to this protocol.

Immediate fixes

Architectural changes that close the most direct risk paths.

  1. 1Remove direct wallet upgrade permissions.Already in place
  2. 2Move upgrade authority to a multisig with a meaningful threshold, such as 3-of-5 or higher.Already in place
  3. 3Add a timelock, such as 24–72 hours, to every upgrade path.
  4. 4Verify that no alternate upgrade path bypasses governance or the timelock.

Operational fixes

Process and monitoring practices that reduce ongoing risk.

  1. 1Monitor implementation changes in real time and alert users on any upgrade.
  2. 2Maintain a public changelog for every upgrade.
  3. 3Document the intended governance and emergency upgrade process.

Evidence

The on-chain data behind the findings above. Switch to Advanced to see raw addresses, blocks, and method-level detail.

Control Map

Who can change the protocol and through which path.

How to read this map
owns = controls another contract or permission
upgrades = can change the implementation
acl of = has an access-control relationship
acl ofmodule ofacl ofNON UPGRADEABLENON UPGRADEABLEcontractguardianguardiangnosis safegovernancegovernancegnosis safeSafe ModuleSafe Modulecontract
acl of: access control relationmodule of: Safe module relation

Governance Bypass Paths

Upgrade paths that may bypass the expected governance or timelock delay.

High Risk

Safe Module Bypass

What we found

Safe a contract has 1 module(s) that can bypass threshold

Impact

If this path is used, the protocol implementation may be changed faster than the normal governance process allows.

Recommended action

Audit this path. Either remove the permission, or place it behind the same multisig and timelock as the standard upgrade route.

Multisig setup

Several wallets must agree before any change can happen.

Signers required
2 of 8 owners
Add-on modules
None
Transaction guard
None

8 signer addresses hidden. Switch to Advanced to see them.

Other control points found

2 additional permissions or admin roles detected across the contracts. They aren't part of the main upgrade chain but still allow some level of control. Switch to Advanced to inspect each one.

Upgrade Activity

Recorded implementation or admin changes detected on-chain.

No upgrades have been recorded for Yearn since it was deployed.

Need this checked for your protocol?

Get a control-plane scan showing who can upgrade your contracts, how fast, and through which paths. Find direct upgrade paths, missing delays, and governance bypasses before they become incident response problems.

Includes authority graph, bypass paths, effective delay, and upgrade history.